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1When a move by one seller evidently forces the other to make a
counter move, he is very stupidly refusing to look further than his
nose if he proceeds on the assumption that it will not.
Chamberlin (1969: 46).
1 Introduction
This paper introduces an intuitive pricing game where …rms undercut each other
to gain market share. The Bertrand outcome is a Nash equilibrium in this game
but it is not necessarily subgame perfect. The interpretation of the subgame
perfect equilibrium is that …rms behave nicely towards each other, unless it
pays to …ght. To illustrate, in a duopoly context, it only pays a …rm to …ght
its opponent if the opponent is substantially weaker (less e¢cient) than the
…rm itself. If the two …rms have similar cost levels, it is more pro…table to be
”nice”, that is to charge a high price. Hence the more similar …rms are, the
higher the equilibrium price. This e¤ect of cost distribution on conduct is not
due to (explicit) collusion. It is the outcome of a pricing game where …rms act
independently, but understand Chamberlin’s observation above.
Although this outcome does not seem unnatural, the subgame perfect equi-
librium has surprising comparative statics results. A rise in the number of …rms
in the market or an increase in e¢ciency for some …rms in the market can raise
the equilibrium price by reducing the incentive to behave aggressively. This
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome formalizes notions like price leadership,
joint dominance, e¢ciency o¤ence and gives a solution to the Bertrand paradox.
The main idea underlying the analysis can be summarized as follows. The
cost distribution in an industry is a major determinant of how competitive or
aggressive …rms’ conduct will be in the industry. This is not the case with
the two most used formalizations of competition in economics: Cournot and
Bertrand competition. To illustrate, consider the following simple example.
There are two industries, denoted I and II, which have the same demand curve
for ahomogenous good: X(p) = 1¡p, where X(p) denotes total demand at price
p. In each industry there are three …rms. Consumers buy from the cheapest
…rm(s) only and if more than one …rm charges this lowest price p they share
2the market equally (i.e. consumers randomize to choose a supplier since all
…rms are identical from their perspective). The industries di¤er in their cost








3 = 0:4. In words, in industry II …rm 2 is closer to
…rm 1 in terms of e¢ciency as compared to industry I. Both Cournot and
Bertrand competition predict that the price in industry II is lower than in
industry I. This is not always a compelling prediction. As shown in section 3.1,
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the pricing game introduced in this paper
predicts that the outcome in industry I is more competitive than in industry
II. The intuition is the following. In industry I, it pays …rm 1 to price very
aggressively and keep …rms 2 and 3 out of the market. That is, …rm 1 chooses
the limitprice pI = cI
2 = 0:35 and is the only seller in the market. However,
in industry II it is very costly for …rm 1 to keep both …rm 2 and 3 out of the
market because …rm 2 is so close in e¢ciency to 1. So, because cII
2 ¡ cII
1 is
small, it is more pro…table for 1 (and 2) to keep only …rm 3 out of the market
and share the market. Thus, pII = cII
3 = 0:4. Put di¤erently, in industry II
there is a balance of power1 between …rms 1 and 2. Because these …rms have
similar e¢ciency levels it is very costly for them to …ght each other. In industry
I, however, …rm 1 is a lot more e¢cient than …rm 2 and hence it pays to …ght
instead of being nice and sharing the market with …rm 2.
Hence the cost distribution, or more precisely the cost gaps between …rms,
determines how aggressive …rms play and how competitive the outcome is in the
industry. So a reduction in some …rm’s cost level (like a reduction in …rm 2’s
cost level from cI
2 to cII
2 in the example above) or entry by a new …rm can close a
cost gap, thereby making the nice outcome more pro…table than the aggressive
option.
This idea that the cost distribution a¤ects how aggressive …rms play, yields
six new insights. First, it gives a formalization of the idea of price leadership.
The price leader(s) in the framework here is (are) the most e¢cient …rm(s) in
1Clearly, this is the same intuition for why the USA and USSR have avoided direct military
con‡ict in the 20thcentury. A real war (insteadof acold one) with afoeof comparable strength
would have been too costly. Also, both countries have picked …ghts with opponents that they
considered rather weak.
3the industry. The idea is that if any …rm has an incentive to reduce the price at
the current price p, it is always pro…table for the most e¢cient …rm(s) to reduce
the price as well. In this sense, the most e¢cient …rms act as price leaders.
Second, the theory sheds light on the e¢ciency defense in the case of mergers.
The e¢ciency defense was formalized by Williamson (1968)2. He modelled a
merger as having two opposite e¤ects on the equilibrium price. On the one
hand, a merger reduces the number of …rms in the industry and hence tends
to raise the price. On the other hand, the merger may through economies of
scale and scope raise the e¢ciency of the merged …rms and hence reduce the
price. If the e¢ciency gain is big enough, it may outweigh the former e¤ect on
the number of …rms and hence the merger reduces price and raises consumer
welfare. The e¢ciency defense, in this view, boils down to showing that the
e¢ciency gains are big enough for the merger to raise welfare and hence it
should not be opposed by competition authorities. However, the analysis here
suggests that if the e¢ciency gain closes the gap between the current price and
the cost level of price leader, it may well lead to a rise in the equilibrium price.
Moreover, a rise in the equilibrium price is more likely if the e¢ciency gain is
big. This can be viewed as a form of an e¢ciency o¤ence (see Röller et. al
(2000)).
Third, the e¢ciency o¤ence result where big e¢ciency gains through merger
cause an increase in the equilibrium price can also be seen as a formalization
of the joint dominance doctrine. The idea of joint dominance is the following.
Consider an industry with three …rms where one is far bigger than the other two.
Now the two small …rms merge and become big as well. The risk of joint domi-
nance is that the remaining two big …rms start to collude. One way to formalize
this is to say that it is easier to collude with two than with three …rms. But
numbers is not necessarily the main issue here. A more interesting argument
here is that the merger creates an industry in which …rms are similar and this
similarity fascilitates collusion (see, for instance, Scherer and Ross (1990: chap-
ter 7) and Tirole (1988: chapter 6)). The explanation for similarity fascilitating
collusion usually depends either on some form of contractual incompleteness
2More recent papers usinga framework similar tothat created by Williamson (1968) include
Salant et al (1983), Perry and Porter (1985), Farell and Shapiro (1990), McAfee et al (1992)
and Gowrisankaran (1999).
4(e.g. side payments between …rms are not allowed, and such side payments to
sustain collusion are more important with asymmetric …rms) or on a bargaining
problem created through the asymmetry (e.g. with symmetric …rms splitting
the surplus equally is a focal point which is absent with asymmetric …rms). In
other words, asymmetry between …rms makes it harder to agree on and sustain
a collusive outcome. The theory presented here also predicts that in industries
with similar …rms the equilibrium price is higher than when …rms di¤er consid-
erably in their e¢ciency levels. However, this does not happen due to collusive
or cooperative behavior by …rms. The point is that with similar …rms it is very
costly to …ght in order to force opponents out of the market. With similar …rms
there is a balance of power and hence …rms are ’nice’ to each other. In this way
the theory formalizes the notion that a merger can change conduct; an aspect
that cannot be captured by Bertrand or Cournot competition.
Fourth, as the example above suggests (and as will be proved below), the
entrance of a new …rm into the market can raise the equilibrium price. This
can happen if the new …rm closes the cost gap between the active …rms in
the market and the next e¢cient …rm. Thus it becomes less attractive to be
aggressive and choose a low price. In other words, this type of entry causes
a switch in conduct from playing aggressively to being nice which raises the
equilibrium price. This is not the …rst paper to consider this non-standard
e¤ect of entry on price. An early paper here is Rosenthal (1980) who considers
…rms selling on di¤erent and separate markets but being restricted to charge
the same price on all markets. He shows that entry on one of these markets can
raise the expected equilibrium price. Another part of the literature has derived
conditions (on demand and cost schedules) under which Cournot competition
yields the prediction that entry raises the equilibrium price. This literature
has been summarized and extended by Amir and Lambson (2000) using lattice
theory. However, they do not show that entry can raise the price cost margins
of …rms (which is important from a competition perspective).3 I work with
constant marginal cost levels implying that a rise in the equilibrium price raises
price cost margins for …rms. Thirdly, there is a literature analyzing the e¤ect of
3In the example given by Amir and Lambson (2000) where entry raises the equilibrium
price, it reduces the price cost margin due to the assumption of increasing returns to scale.
5entry on price in markets of imperfect information. Stiglitz (1989) surveys this
literature and gives the following example. Assume consumers know the price
distribution in a market but they have to incur a …xed cost to …nd out which
price a particular …rm charges. Consider the incentive of a …rm to reduce its
price. If there are only 3 …rms in the market, reducing your price substantially
attracts a large number of new customers because their expected search cost
before they …nd you is low. If there are a 100 …rms in the market, consumers’
expected search cost to …nd a particular low cost …rm is high and hence their
incentive to look for this …rm is low. Consequently, a …rm’s incentive to reduce
its price are weak and thus prices are higher with 100 …rms than with 3 …rms:
entry can raise the equilibrium price. Finally, there is a recent auction literature
showing that a rise in the number of bidders can lower the price. I discuss this
literature in section 3.3.
Fifth, the subgame perfect equilibrium in the pricing game solves the Bertrand
paradox. This paradox starts from the observation that Bertrand competition
in a duopoly with two …rms that produce a homogenous good with the same
constant marginal costs yields a price equal to marginal costs. This is called a
paradox because it seems counterintuitive that two …rms are su¢cient to get the
perfect competition outcome of price equal to marginal costs. Surely, two …rms
competing in prices must be able to get to an outcome with a strictly positive
price cost margin. This is exactly the prediction of the subgame perfect equi-
librium of the pricing game here. If there are no potential entrants, the pricing
game comes to an end at the monopoly price and the …rms share the market
equally. The intuition for this result is discussed below using the concept of
conjectural variation. The result that a dynamic extensive form pricing game
removes the Bertrand paradox has already been noted by Maskin and Tirole
(1988). The main di¤erence between their paper and mine is that here …rms do
not sell until the pricing game is …nished and the equilibrium price reached. In
Maskin and Tirole (1988) …rms sell to consumers at each stage of the pricing
game. This allows them to analyze equilibrium price dynamics, deriving con-
ditions under which Edgeworth cycles are an equilibrium outcome. Since my
focus is not on price dynamics but on the e¤ect of industry structure (number of
…rms and their e¢ciency levels) on the equilibrium price, I use a simpler pricing
6game.
Finally, the results in this paper can also be seen as contributing to the liter-
ature on conjectural variations and, in particular, to the literature on consistent
conjectures. This is not surprising since this literature tries to give a dynamic
‡avour to an otherwise static model whereas below these dynamics are made
explicit. The major advantage of the conjectural variation literature is that it
gives a simple intuition of why Bertrand competition yields a more competitive
outcome than Cournot competition. Because this intuition will be used below,
it is worth stating it explicitly. With Bertrand competition …rms conjecture
that their opponents keep their price constant (the Nash assumption on the
strategic variable price). So when a …rm considers expanding its output level a
bit, it expects its opponents to reduce their output in response (otherwise they
cannot keep their prices constant). In other words, a …rm expects its opponents
to be soft: a rise in output is met by a reduction in opponents’ output. This
makes …rms aggressive and hence the outcome is very competitive. In contrast,
under Cournot competition …rms conjecture that their opponents keep their
output level constant (the Nash assumption on the strategic variable quantity).
This implies that any increase in output is met by a relatively big fall in price.
This more aggressive (expected) response by opponents makes …rms less aggres-
sive and hence the outcome is less competitive (prices are higher) than under
Bertrand competition. The major disadvantage of the conjectural variation lit-
erature is that anything goes: every conjecture yields a di¤erent equilibrium
outcome. Instead of assuming that …rms choose price or output as strategic
variables, Grant and Quiggin (1994) argue that it is at least as reasonable to
view …rms as choosing mark-ups or revenues. However, these latter strategies
yield a di¤erent set of predictions. How does one choose the right conjecture?
The literature on consistent conjectures tries to answer this question: the
right conjecture is the one that is consistent. To illustrate, the Bertrand con-
jecture is not consistent in the following sense. Starting at the monopoly price,
…rms undercut each other assuming that their opponents keep their price con-
stant but clearly they don’t. A seminal paper on consistent conjectures is Bres-
nahan (1981). However, instead of solving the indetermancy, as Klemperer and
Meyer (1988) show, it turns out that every outcome can be a consistent con-
7jecture equilibrium.4 One way to get back to a unique equilibrium outcome
is to add exogenous uncertainty to the …rms’ problem, as is shown by Klem-
perer and Meyer (1989) in the context of supply functions. In a sense, the
uncertainty in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) plays a similar role as subgame
perfection in the pricing game below: both force reactions to be optimal re-
actions in the (sub)game where the reaction has to be played. This removes
threats and promises by players that are not credible.
Also the subgame perfection requirement makes players’ believes (conjec-
tures) about other players’ behavior correct (consistent). This leads to an out-
come that is less competitive than Bertrand competition for the following reason.
Firms understand that when they undercut the current price, the optimal re-
sponse of all other …rms (with marginal costs below the new price) is to follow
that price cut. This response is more aggressive than the Bertrand conjecture
(…rms stick to their higher price) and hence …rms behave less aggressively. Con-
sequently the outcome is less competitive (higher price) than under Bertrand
competition.
Although throughout the paper I emphasize the idea of consistent conjec-
tures to understand the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, one can also view
this outcome in the light of fast responses by …rms to new (price) information.
I come back to this in section 5.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the pricing game
and its subgame perfect equilibrium. Section 3 gives three examples to highlight
the main results in a simple setting. Section 4 analyses the subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome and shows the implications for competition policy. Section
5 discusses some extensions of the model and section 6 concludes the paper.
Proofs of all results can be found in the appendix.
4More precisely, the Bresnahan (1981) paper has a problem with existence of the consistent
conjectureequilibrium,as pointed out by Robson (1983). In responsetothis, Bresnahan(1983)
generalized the consistent conjecture equilibrium concept. Klemperer and Meyer (1988)’s
indetermancy result uses this generalized concept.
82 The model
This section introduces the industry characteristics and describes an extensive
form pricing game that determines the industry price. It turns out that the
Bertrand outcome is a Nash equilibrium in this game, however it is not nec-
essarily subgame perfect. I characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium and
show that it is (generically) unique. Finally, I show that subgame perfection in
this game removes the Bertrand paradox.
2.1 Industry conditions
Consider an industry where …rms produce a homogenous good with constant
marginal cost levels. Firm i produces with constant marginal costs ci ¸ 0. Let
X (p) denote industry demand which is continuously decreasing in p. The num-
ber of …rms that can be active in the industry is denoted by N 2 @. Throughout
this paper, I make the following assumptions on the industry cost and demand
structures.
Assumption c0 · c1 · ::: · cN · pm = argmaxp fX (p)(p¡ c0)g. Fur-
ther, X (p) (p¡ c0) > X (p0) (p0 ¡ c0) for each p0 and p satisfying p0 < p < pm.
In words, …rms are indexed such that higher indices indicate (weakly) higher
marginal cost levels. Because …rm 0 is never willing to produce at a price
above its monopoly price pm, …rms with marginal cost levels exceeding …rm 0’s
monopoly price are excluded, without loss of generality. Finally, I assume that
…rm 0’s pro…ts as monopolist are increasing in p 2 [0;pm].
2.2 Extensive form pricing game
This section describes the extensive form game that leads to the equilibrium
price. I assume that all information in this game is publicly known. That is,
the demand function and …rms’ marginal cost levels are common knowledge.
None of the results below depend on asymmetric information.
The game starts at a high price, say p0 = pm, and N …rms. A round s in the
game is described by the number of players still in the game ns, their marginal
9cost levels and the current price ps. Each round consists of two stages. In the
…rst stage, all remaining bidders simultaneously and independently make bids
to undercut the current price ps (players that do not wish to reduce the price,
simply bid ps again). Let ps+1 denote the lowest price bid in the …rst stage of
round s. If no …rm strictly undercut the price ps (i.e. ps+1 = ps) the game
ends. In this case, the …nal price equals p = ps and the number of …rms equals
n = ns. If ps+1 < ps then …rms can leave the game in the second stage of this
round s. Firms that do not leave the game, enter round s + 1 with the new
current price ps+1 and number of …rms ns+1.
Pay o¤s in this game are as follows. Any …rm that has left the game gets
a pay o¤ of 0. A …rm i that has not left the game gets a pay o¤ equal to
X(p)
n (p ¡ ci). That is, each of the n …rms that are still in the game when the
bidding ends, is required to sell at the equilibrium price p and produce
X(p)
n
units of output. Note that, in contrast to Maskin and Tirole (1988), …rms do
not produce until the pricing game ends. I come back to this in section 5.
The industry story is as follows. Firms can enter and leave the industry
without costs, therefore the pay o¤ of a …rm that leaves the bidding game is
0. Further, all …rms that are willing to sell at a price p share the market
equally. This is not unreasonable, because …rms produce homogenous goods
and consumers faced with n producers o¤ering an identical product at the same
price presumably pick a seller at random. I come back to this in section 5.
The …rst lemma characterizes a Nash equilibrium of this pricing game.
Lemma 1 The Bertrand outcome p = c1 is a Nash equilibrium outcome in this
game.
This result implies that pro…ts are zero if c1 = c0. The result is not surprising
since the pricing game described above is a formalization of the stories that are
told to give the intuition for the Bertrand outcome (see, for instance, Scherer
and Ross (1990: chapter 6) and Tirole (1988: chapter 5)). But, as the next
section shows, the Betrand outcome is not necessarily subgame perfect. The
subgame perfection captures Fisher’s (1898: 126) critisism of the Cournot and
Bertrand equilibrium concepts that ”no business man assumes either that his
rival’s output or price willremain constant any more than a chess player assumes
that his opponent will not interfere with his e¤ort to capture a knight. On the
10contrary, his whole thought is to forecast what move the rival will make in
response to one of his own”.
2.3 Subgame perfect equilibrium
The following notation is used in characterizing the subgame perfect equilibrium






j (cj ¡ ci) ¸
X(ck)
k (ck ¡ ci)for each k 2 f0;1;:::;Ng
o
In words, p¤
i denotes the price level that maximizes …rm i’s pay o¤s given
that only …rms with marginal costs below p¤
i will remain active in the production
stage (as shown below, this is what happens in equilibrium). In particular, if
p¤
i = cj, …rms j;j + 1;:::;N leave the pricing game and there are j …rms left
to produce and sell (i.e. …rms 0;1;:::;j ¡ 1 are left). Theorem 3 below shows
that these prices form part of …rms’ subgame perfect strategies and the subgame
perfect equilibrium price equals p¤
0. Note that a price level strictly inbetween
two …rm’s cost levels, p 2 hcj;cj+1i for some j and j + 1, can never be optimal
for …rm i. In such a case, a price equal to cj+1 yields higher pro…ts, because
it is a higher price but does not lead to more …rms producing and selling in
the industry. In principle, there could be two or more di¤erent values of cj
that satisfy the inequalities in the de…nition for p¤
i. However, thinking of the
cost levels cj as being drawn from some atomless distribution with support [c; ¹ c]
this is a probability zero event. Hence, generically speaking each p¤
i is uniquely
de…ned.
Lemma 2 (Price leadership) The …rm with the lowest marginal cost level, de-







2 · ::: · p
¤
N
This lemma gives a formalization of price leadership that does not rely on
…rst mover advantages. Firm 0 correctly predicts that …rms with marginal cost
levels above the equilibrium price p will leave the market. Taking this into
account, it chooses the price that is most pro…table. Firm 0 is price leader in
the sense that no other …rm is willing to undercut its pro…t maximizing price.
11The intuition is that a low price raises the amount of output a …rm produces
(because a price reduction raises demand and reduces the number of …rms left
in the market), and this is most pro…table to a low cost …rm.
Theorem 3 For the pricing game above there exists a subgame perfect equilib-
rium in pure strategies. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is (generi-
cally) unique. The equilibrium price equals
p = p¤
0
And only …rms with cj < p¤
0 produce output.
Strategy pro…les leading to this equilibrium outcome5 prescribe for …rm i in any
round s of the pricing game to do the following:6
if ps > p¤
i then bid p¤
i
if ps · p¤
i then do not undercut ps
if ps > ci then stay in the game
if ps · ci then leave the game
In other words, the subgame perfect equilibrium price is determined as fol-
lows: p = ci where i is determined by
X (ci)
i
(ci ¡ c0) ¸
X (cj)
j
(cj ¡ c0) for each j 2 f1;2;:::;Ng (1)
and the …rms that produce (a strictly positive quantity) are …rms 0;1;:::;i ¡ 1.
Strategy pro…les that bring this equilibrium price about are the following. Each
…rm i bids its optimal price p¤
i if the current price is above that price. Further,
a …rm leaves if the price is equal to or below its marginal cost level and stays
in the pricing game as long as the price is above its marginal cost level.
5Note that, although the subgame perfect equilibrium price is unique, the strategy pro…les
leading to this equilibrium are clearly not unique. For instance, because there is no cost of
delay, a strategy pro…le for player i saying ’if ps > p¤
i then undercut the current price by one
cent’ leads to the same pay o¤s to everyone as the strategies presented here.
6Strictly speaking this is not complete. In principle, also subgames should be
considered where …rm i is still active but where …rms j < i have already left.
This does not a¤ect i’s exit strategy but does a¤ect i’s bid. To illustrate, con-
sider the subgame where only …rm 0 has left. Player i’s optimal bid now equals ½
cjj
X(cj)
j¡1 (cj ¡ci) ¸
X(ck)
k¡1 (ck ¡ ci) for each k 2f1;:::;Ng
¾
. Clearly, taking these possi-
bilities explicitly into account makes the analysis notationally heavy, while no additional
insights are gained.
12The following corollary shows that the Bertrand paradox cannot happen in
this model.
Corollary 4 If c0 = c1 = ::: = cj > cj+1 then p > c0:
One way to understand why the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is
less aggressive than the Bertrand outcome is to use the idea of conjectural
variation. In the Bertrand outcome a …rm expects it opponents to keep their
price constant. That is, when the …rm underbids the current price it expects
its opponents to leave the pricing game and hence a small price reduction gives
this …rm the whole market. Because it expects it opponents to be soft (to leave
the pricing game when it reduces the price) each …rm behaves very aggressively
and hence the outcome is aggressive. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, a …rm
understands that each price reduction will be followed by all …rms with marginal
costs below the price. Hence a …rm expects a rather assertive response from its
opponents. This reduces the incentive to be aggressive and hence the outcome
is less competitive.
3 Three examples
This section presents three simple illustrations of the analysis. First, I analyze
the example mentioned in the introduction. Then I analyze the new theory with
a continuum of …rm types to show how similar analytically the new theory is as
compared to the standard theory of …rm pricing decisions. Finally, I use auction
theory to further illustrate the industrial organization issue I am analyzing here.
This makes clear why I do not get the standard second price auction equilibrium
outcome which corresponds to the Bertrand outcome.
3.1 Cournot vs Bertrand
This section analyzes more carefully the example with two industries given in
the introduction. Recall that in both industries the demand function is given
by X (p) = 1¡ p, where p is the industry price (the lowest price charged by any
…rm) and X equals total demand (for the homogenous good) at that price. If n
…rms are charging this price p then consumers choose their seller randomly in
13such a way that each …rm sells
X(p)
n units of output. In industry I the (constant
marginal) cost distribution of the three …rms is cI
1 = 0;cI
2 = 0:35;cI
3 = 0:4 and




First, I derive the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the pricing game
in these two industries. Then I compare these to the Cournot and Bertrand
equilibrium outcomes.
Using equation (1), the subgame perfect equilibrium price is determined as
follows. In industry I, …rm 1 considers three possible prices: 0:35 and be the
only …rm in the market, 0:4 and share the market with …rm 2 and thirdly a
price equal to the monopoly price 0:5 and share the market with …rms 2 and 3.
The following inequalities show that pI = 0:35 is the equilibrium price. Note
that …rm 1’s pro…ts equal
X (p)






















Hence the subgame perfect equilibrium price in industry II equals pII = 0:4
which is higher than the equilibrium price in industry I. The intuition is that
it is too costly for …rm 1 to keep …rm 2 out of the market in industry II, while
this is not very costly in industry I. Hence …rm 1 is more aggressive in industry
I and the equilibrium price is lower than in industry II.
Can we capture this intuition using the equilibrium concepts of Cournot or
Bertrand competition? The answer is yes, but in a way which is not appealing
from a conceptual point of view. To see this, consider table 1 which summarizes
some characteristics of the equilibria in industries I and II where ¼1 denotes
the pro…ts of …rm 1, p the equilibrium price and n the number of active …rms
in equilibrium.
14Industry ¼1 p n
I Cournot 0:19 0:44 3
Bertrand 0:23 0:35 1
II Cournot 0:13 0:37 2
Bertrand 0:09 0:10 1
Table 1: equilibrium con…gurations
for industries I and II with Cournot
and Bertrand competition
Note that with Bertrand competition there is only one …rm in the market
because the most e¢cient …rm (1) chooses a price equal to the cost level of the
next e¢cient …rm (p = c2). With Cournot competition more than one …rm is ac-
tive in both industries. Next, note that both Cournot and Bertrand competition
predict that the outcome in industry II is more competitive than in industry I
(pII < pI). One way to capture the idea above that the outcome in industry I
can be more competitive than in II is to consider …rm 1’s pro…ts. In industry I,
…rm 1’s pro…ts are higher with Bertrand than with Cournot competition, while
in industry II …rm 1’s pro…ts are higher with Cournot competition. Hence, if
…rm 1 could choose then it would prefer to play Bertrand competition in indus-
try I (pI = 0:35) and play Cournot competition in II (pII = 0:37). However,
there is no convincing way in which …rm 1 can choose to play Cournot in in-
dustry II. How does 1 convince …rm 2 that the right conjecture is that 1 keeps
its output level constant? Part of the problem is here that both the Bertrand
and the Cournot conjecture are incorrect (or inconsistent in the terminology
of Bresnahan (1981)) making it hard to select one or the other. However, the
subgame perfect equilibrium concept imposes correct believes about opponents’
actions and hence is a natural way to formalize the prediction that the outcome
in I will be more competitive than in II.
3.2 Continuous types
This section shows that although the analysis is done here with a discrete num-
ber of …rms (and hence sets of inequalities are used instead of the usual …rst
order conditions) the mathematics is essentially similar to standard monopoly
pricing problems. This is done by assuming a continuous distribution of …rms.
15In particular, assume that …rms’ costs are distributed on [c¤;c¤] with distribu-
tion function F (:). Then using a version of equation (1) de…ned for continuous






By lowering the price, …rms reduce the margin (p ¡ c¤), raise demand X (p) and
reduce the number of …rms that can pro…tably produce at that price. The last
e¤ect is captured by F (p): the proportion of …rms that have marginal cost levels
below p and hence stay in the market at that price p. De…ning q(p) ´
X(p)
F(p)
as the production of a …rm with costlevel c¤, shows that with continuous cost
distributions the mathematics of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is
not more complex than the mathematics of the monopoly problem: the outcome
is determined as maxp q(p)(p¡ c¤).
3.3 PEA auction
Following Klemperer’s (2000) suggestion, I use auction theory to illustrate the
I.O. results introduced above. In particular, I modify the English auction in such
a way that in equilibrium it is not necessarily the case that the buyer with the
highest valuation gets the object at a price equal to the next highest valuation.
This modi…ed English auction is denoted a Passive English Auctioneer (PEA)
auction. The rules of the game are as follows. The auction starts at a price
equal to zero. The buyers indicate whether they are willing to buy at the current
price, say by leaving the auction room if they are not willing to buy anymore at
that price (or a higher one). In addition to this, any buyer in the auction room
can raise the price. If no buyer further raises the price and if there are n ¸ 1
buyers left, the auctioneer randomly allocates the good to one of the remaining
buyers and each buyer has a probability of
1
nth of winning the good and paying
the current price. A buyer who does not get the good pays nothing. In other
words, if the number of remaining buyers n equals 2 or more the excess demand
is not resolved through increasing the price but through a rationing scheme.
This is clearly not an optimal auction, as an active auctioneer could raise the
revenue of the auction through raising the price until only one buyer were left.
That is why the auctioneer here is called passive.
16In an I.O. context this passive auctioneer assumption often makes sense.
If a number of …rms sell the same product at the same price, consumers are
indi¤erent between the sellers and buy randomly from any …rm. Moreover, in
this context, there is no auctioneer who can actively change the price to resolve
excess supply.
There is a Nash equilibrium of the PEA auction where the buyer with the
highest valuation gets the good at a price equal to the second highest valuation.
In terms of the conjectural variations literature, this equilibrium comes about
if each buyer believes that when he raises the price in the auction, the other
buyers keep their bid constant (the Bertrand-Nash assumption). Then the buyer
with the highest valuation will raise the price until all other buyers have left
the auction. However, the problem is that this belief is not part of a subgame
perfect equilibrium, because other buyers will stay in the auction until the price
equals or exceeds their valuation.
I want to stress two properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
PEA auction.7 First, that the most e¢cient player does not necessarily bid up
the price until all other buyers leave the auction. Second, that adding another
buyer (which has in fact a very high valuation) can reduce the equilibrium price.
Below these results are related to recent papers in the auction literature.
Example Consider a private value auction where the valuations of buyers
1;2 and 3 for the auctioned good equal resp. q1 = 21
2;q2 = 2 and q3 = 1. Using
the auction equivalent of equation (1), the subgame perfect equilibrium price
equals the price that maximizes bidder 1’s pay o¤. Buyer 1 has three relevant
choices for the price: p = 0 and a probability of 1
3 of getting the good, p = 1
and a probability of 1
2 of winning and p = 2 in which case buyer 1 gets the good












In words, it is most pro…table for player 1 to choose a price equal to 0 and
’share’ the good with buyers 2 and 3. Hence the Nash equilibrium where player
7Note that to make these points there is no need to introduce asymmetric information into
this auction example. Introducing asymmetric information about other buyers’ valuations
complicates the analysis, but does not a¤ect these results. I come back to this below.
171 gets the good for certain at a price equal to the second highest valuation is not
subgame perfect. Now consider what happens when player 2 is removed from
the market. In a standard second price auction, removing the buyer with the
second highest valuation will reduce the revenue of the auction. Here we get the
opposite result. Player 1 has now two relevant choices for the price: p = 0 and
a probability of
1
2 of getting the good and p = 1 in which case buyer 1 gets the










Hence, as player 2 leaves the market, player 1 becomes more aggressive and the
price goes up. The intuition that 1 becomes more aggressive is that the distance
between 1 and the next best player 3 is rather big. If this distance is big, it pays
o¤ to be aggressive. If this distance is small, being aggressive is rather costly
and players behave in a more friendly way.
The result that player 1 prefers to share the market at a low price can
be discussed in the light of a paper by Gilbert and Klemperer (2000) where
conditions are derived under which rationing is optimal from the auctioneer’s
point of view. Note that the sharing result is indeed a form of rationing: there
is excess demand (three buyers, one product) at the current price (p = 0) and
yet the price does not go up; the good is allocated randomly. However, above I
have argued that this is optimal from the point of view of the buyers, not the
seller. The argument given by Gilbert and Klemperer is the following. Suppose
that potential buyers need to incur a sunk cost before they enter the auction
(e.g. they have to spend resources to see what the auctioned good is worth to
them). Then to ensure that the good will actually be sold, the auctioneer may
want to attract weak buyers as well (i.e. buyers whose valuations are drawn
from distributions that are dominated by the distribution of the strong buyers).
One way to do that is for the auctioneer to commit to rationing, because that
raises the expected surplus for weak buyers as compared to a market clearing
price.
The result that the equilibrium price can fall as another buyer is added has
also been noted in Bulow and Klemperer (1999). The mechanism through which
this happens is, however, a completely di¤erent one. Bulow and Klemperer
18consider (almost) common value auctions. In such an auction the winner may
su¤er from the winner’s curse: the fact that he wins the auction makes it likely
that he has overestimated the value of the good. As the number of bidders
goes up, it becomes more likely that the winner has overestimated the value of
the good: the curse gets worse. Rational players take this e¤ect into account
and shade their bids more strongly as the number of players goes up. Hence, a
higher number of bidders can lead to lower expected revenues in the auction.
In the example above, there is a private values auction and hence the winner’s
curse plays no role. Also, with the winner’s curse the problem is that players
fear that the entrant has a low signal for (bad news about) the value of the
auctioned good. In the example above, however, the price reduction is caused
by adding a high value player (bidder 2). This bidder with a high valuation
makes it less pro…table for player 1 to bid aggressively.
Note that in the PEA auction, although …rm 1 is worse o¤ with player 2
added, …rm 3 gains when …rm 2 enters the market. Below, I come back to this
asymmetric reaction of pay o¤s in response to entry and exit.
Finally, the result in the PEA auction that it can be optimal for bidders
to ”share” the good at a low price can also be obtained in the context of a
simultaneous ascending auction.8 Consider the case with two bidders and and
two goods. Bidder 1 values each of these goods at q1 = 21
2 and bidder two
values each at q2 = 2. That is, if bidder i gets one (both) good(s) at a price
equal to p (prices equal to p and p0) his pay o¤ is qi ¡ p (2qi ¡ p ¡ p0). It is
routine to verify that in a simultaneous ascending auction the equilibrium price
is 0 in this case and each bidder gets one good. If the valuation of bidder 2 is
reduced to q2 = 1, the equilirbium price rises to one and bidder 1 obtains both
goods.
4 Analysis: implications for competition policy
This section derives a number of properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium.
First, I derive a result that limits the relevant comparative statics that need
to be considered and a result on the e¤ect on pro…ts of entry and e¢ciency
8I thank Paul Klemperer for bringing this simultaneous ascending auction example to my
attention.
19gains. Then I analyze the e¤ects on the equilibrium price of entry, e¢ciency
gains by …rms, mergers and the introduction of a single market. Since the
comparative statics results for the subgame perfect equilibrium di¤er starkly
from the results for the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, one may ask the question
which set of predictions is most convincing for a given market. I come back to
this question in the next section (with a formal result in lemma 17).
Consider an industry where the equilibrium price is p. What would the
equilibrium price have been if there was an additional …rm with cost level ce > p?
And what would the equilibrium price have been if an existing …rm j’s costs
cj > p were lower but still above p?
Lemma 5 A rise in the number of participating …rms N through entry with
cost level of the entrant ce > p or a fall in cost level of an existing …rm j from
cj to c0
j 2 hp;cji has no e¤ect on the equilibrium price p.
Both the entry of an additional …rm and the fall in costs described in the
lemma, make a price rise above the current equilibrium price p less attractive.
Further, nothing changes for potential price choices below the current price p.
Hence the equilibrium price will not change in response to such changes.
Although below I derive results that the equilibrium price can rise with the
number of …rms in the industry and that it can fall with …rms’ cost levels, it is
always the case that the price leader is (weakly) better o¤ with less opponents
and with less e¢cient opponents.
Lemma 6 The pro…ts of the price leader (…rm 0) are non-increasing in the
number of other …rms N and is non-decreasing in the cost levels of the other
…rms in the industry.
However, the pro…ts of …rms in the industry with ci > c0 can rise with the
number of …rms and fall with other …rms’ cost levels.
The latter part of the lemma was already illustrated by the auction example
in section 3.3. The weak bidder gains by adding another bidder to the auction.
The intuition is that entry or e¢ciency gains by …rms with ci > c0 can make it
less pro…table for the price leader to price aggressively. If …rm 0 decides to raise
its price in response to such changes, some …rms can now pro…tably produce
that were priced out of the market before the change.
20Hence, unlike Bertrand or Cournot competition, entry or e¢ciency gains by
opponents do not a¤ect all …rms’ pro…ts in the same direction. When discussing
mergers, this property gives an explanation of why some …rms in an industry
oppose a merger while other (non-merging) …rms favour the merger.
4.1 E¤ect of entry on equilibrium price
This subsection presents results on the e¤ect of entry on the equilibrium price.
Conventional wisdom says that the price goes down as more …rms enter the
industry. Results are derived that con…rm this intuition for the subgame perfect
equilibrium price, but also conditions are derived under which entry leads to a
rise in the equilibrium price. The idea of the results is to compare the subgame
perfect equilibrium with and without the additional …rm.9
Lemma 7 Assume
X(ci)
i (ci ¡ c0) >
X(cj)
j (cj ¡ c0) for each j 6= i and a new
…rm enters with ce 2 hck¡1;cki with k < i. Then the new equilibrium price p0
satis…es
p0 = 2 fck;:::;ci¡1g
This result says that if the current equilibrium price is p = ci and a …rm
enters with cost ce < p, then the new subgame perfect equilibrium price does
not lie strictly between ce and ci. In other words, …rm 0 then …nds it optimal
to either price at ci or higher or at ce or lower. The intuition is that the price
leader wants either to price the entrant out of the market and lower the price
substantially. Or the new …rm closes a cost gap which makes aggressive behavior
by the priceleader no longer pro…table. As a result the price goes up.
The next corollory of this result is used in the proof that a rise in the number
of …rms can raise the equilibrium price.
9If one wants to interpret the results as dynamic adjustment from an equilibrium without
the entrant toan equilibrium with the entrant, oneneeds to assume that after entrythe pricing
game starts again at a very high price. Sometimes it is more reasonable to assume that the
pricing game starts at the current price and that …rms may raise the price. In that case, a
transition to an equilibrium with a higher price may not materialize, because the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the pricing game may generate a kinked demand curve type of result.
The analysis here has this property in common with the dynamic game analysed by Maskin
and Tirole (1988). The issue is left for further research.
21Corollary 8 Assume
X(ci)
i (ci ¡ c0) >
X(cj)
j (cj ¡ c0) for each j 6= i. If a new
…rm enters with ce 2 hc0;c1i, then the new equilibrium price p0 satis…es
p
0 2 fceg [ fci;:::;cNg
If a new …rm enters with ce = c0, then the equilibrium price satis…es
p
0 2 fci;:::;cNg
This corollary says that due to entry with a cost level very close to c0 (ce 2
hc0;c1i) the price either falls dramatically to ce or it does not fall at all. Clearly,
as ce comes closer and closer to c0, the option of pricing the entrant out of the
market becomes less and less attractive for the priceleader and the price will
tend to rise.
This formalizes the intuition that in an industry with similar …rms, one
should expect a high price. In fact, adding a…rm with cost level equal to c0 never
lowers the subgame perfect equilibrium price. Moreover, one can show that by
adding enough new …rms with cost level c0, the subgame perfect equilibrium
will be the monopoly price pm. Although having more symmetric …rms makes
the collusion outcome more likely, the pricing game does not add (explicit)
collusive considerations to get the result: every …rm acts independently. In
the words of Chamberlin (1969: 48), the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
has the property that ”since the result of a [price] cut by any one […rm] is
inevitably to decrease his own pro…ts, no one will cut, and although the sellers
are entirely independent, the equilibrium result is the same as though there were
a monopolistic agreement between them”.
The next lemma derives results on the e¤ects of exit.
Lemma 9 Assume
X(ci)
i (ci ¡ c0) >
X (cj)
j (cj ¡ c0) for each j 6= i:
(i) If a …rm l 2 f1;2;:::;i ¡ 1g decides not to enter the pricing game, then the
equilibrium price does not rise and may fall.
(ii) If a …rm l 2 fi + 1;:::;Ng decides not to enter the pricing game, then the
equilibrium price does not fall and may rise.
The intuition for the …rst result is that because a …rm that is currently
producing leaves the market, a gap is created which makes it (weakly) more
22pro…table for the price leader to become more aggressive. Because by lowering
the price a bit the number of …rms with which the market is shared can be
reduced substantially, the equilibrium price tends to fall. If, on the other hand,
a …rm with costs above the equilibrium price leaves, a gap may be created which
allows the price leader to raise the price substantially without inviting too many
…rms to start production as well. Hence, if such a …rm decides not to enter the
pricing game, the equilibrium price may rise.
The following result gives necessary and su¢cient conditions for entry to
lead to a rise in the price level.
Lemma 10 Consider an industry with n active …rms, that is p = cn. Assume
that a …rm e enters with cost level ce 2 hcl¡1;cli with cl < cn = p. Then the
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(cj ¡ c0)
X (cj)
j+1 for cj ¸ cl
(cj ¡ c0)
X (cj)





These inequalities are straightforward to check in a particular example. In
section 3.3 above, I have already shown that it is possible to construct examples
in which entry indeed causes a rise in the equilibrium price level (note that this
was done in an auction context and therefore the point was that entry can lower
the equilibrium price). One may wonder how easy it is to satisfy the inequalities
above. Is this only possible for cases where the number of active …rms n is small,
or does this hold more generally? The next result shows that indeed such cases
can be constructed for arbitrary n.
Proposition 11 For any n > 1 there exists an industry cost distribution such
that entry by a …rm e causes a rise in the price level.
In the appendix this result is proved by constructing, for arbitrary n, a cost
distribution that satis…es the inequalities in lemma 10 above. So the result that
entry can raise the equilibrium price is rather robust and does not depend on
small numbers.
The following result derives conditions for the more conventional case where
entry leads to a fall in the equilibrium price.
23Lemma 12 Assume that
X(ci)
i (ci ¡ c0) >
X(cj)
j (cj ¡ c0) for each j 6= i.
(i) There exists " > 0 such that ce 2 hci ¡ ";cii implies that p0 = ce < ci = p.
(ii) For every ce 2 hc0;cii there exists a number E 2 @+ such that if E or more
…rms enter with cost level ce the equilibrium price falls to or below ce.
The …rst result says that the priceleader prefers to keep an entrant out of
the market with a cost level ce just below the equilibrium price. Hence the price
falls in response to such potential entry. The idea of the second result is that
by adding enough …rms at a cost level strictly above c0, it becomes pro…table
for …rm 0 to keep these …rms out of the industry by choosing a price equal to
ce.
4.2 E¤ect of cost reductions on price
Usually we think that a reduction in a …rm’s cost level never leads to an increase
in the equilibrium price in the market. Indeed this can never happen in a
Cournot or Bertrand model. However, in the model here, we can have that a
fall in production costs for a …rm leads to a rise in the equilibrium price.
Proposition 13 If there exists j > i such that
X (ci)
i
(ci ¡ c0) >
X (cj)
j
(cj ¡ c0) >
X (ck)
k
(ck ¡ c0) for each k 6= i;j
then any reduction in ci to c0
i 2 [c0;ci¡1] leads to a rise in the equilibrium price
from p = ci to p0 = cj.
In this context we can also get the result that a reduction in costs can lower
the equilibrium price.
Lemma 14 Assume that
X(ci)
i (ci ¡ c0) >
X(cj)
j (cj ¡ c0) for each j 6= i:
(i) There exists " > 0 such that a fall in cost ci to c0
i 2 hci ¡ ";cii leads to a
reduction in the equilibrium price.
(ii) If an active …rm’s cost level ck 2 hc0;cii is reduced below c0 then the equi-
librium price does not rise.
The intuition for the …rst result is the following. If it is optimal for the price
leader to keep …rm i out of the market, then a small e¢ciency gain by i does
24not change that. Hence, the price leader wants to keep …rm i out of the market
and hence reduces the price. The second result says that if a …rm gains so much
in e¢ciency that it becomes the new price leader, the equilibrium price does
not rise. The intuition is that lower costs make higher output and hence lower
prices more attractive. Therefore the new price leader will never want to raise
the price.
Taking proposition 13 and lemma 14 together we get the following picture.
Small cost reductions (from ci to ci ¡ ") lead to a fall in the equilibrium price.
Bigger cost reductions (from ci to c0
i 2 [c0;ci¡1]) can raise the equilibrium
price and major cost reductions (below the costs c0 of the price leader) tend to
reduce the price again. In other words, the relation between industry structure
(in terms of …rms’ e¢ciency levels) and equilbrium price is rather subtle and
there is no reason to expect a simple monotone relation.
If a …rm enters with ce < c0, then the e¤ect on equilibrium price is ambigu-
ous. To see this, entry of a …rm with ce < c0 can be seen as the ’sum’ of two
comparative statics exercises. First, there is entry by a new …rm with cost level
ce 2 hc0;cii. Lemma 9 implies that in this case the price does not fall (and
may rise). Second, an existing …rm’s cost level ce 2 hc0;cii is reduced below c0.
Lemma 14 implies that then the price does not rise (and may fall). The overall
e¤ect of entry with ce < c0 on the equilibrium price depends on which of these
two e¤ects dominates.
The analysis of cost reductions above can be applied to the introduction of
a single market in Europe. As the next example shows, with the subgame per-
fect equilibrium of the pricing game it is not obvious that a reduction in trade
barriers leads to a fall in prices.
Example Consider two countries A and B, where in each country there
is one …rm (a and b resp.) producing a homogenous good with zero marginal
costs ( ca = cb = 0). In both countries, the demand relation is of the form
x(p) = 1 ¡ p. Hence the monopoly price in each country is pm = 0:5. Let p
j
i
denote the price …rm j = a;b charges in country i = A;B. I do not require a
…rm to charge the same price in both countries. Let t denote the import tari¤
that …rm a ( b) pays to sell its product in country B ( A). Then for t ¸ pm





8;pmi10, the price each …rms charges equals t and each …rm only





8i each …rm sells in both countries
at the monopoly price pm. Hence, the equilibrium price as a function of t is
nonmonotone, as shown in …gure 1. Note the di¤erence between the theory here
and a theory based on collusive behaviour. With full collusion, for any t > 0
…rms will choose to sell on their home market only and not export. In contrast,
the subgame perfect equilibrium requires …rms a and b to share both market A
and B equally.
-Figure 1 around here-
Hence over arange of values of import tari¤s, prices fall as tari¤s are reduced.
However, if …rms are symmetric and tari¤s fall below a certain treshold, pricing
aggressively to keep other …rms out of the market is no longer pro…table. In
contrast, it becomes optimal to accomodate, charge the monopoly price and
share the markets with foreign …rms.
4.3 E¤ects of mergers: joint dominance
Finally, I consider the implications of the theory here for merger analysis. In
particular, I want to focus on two e¤ects. First, the e¤ect that a merger with big
e¢ciency gains can create an industry where …rms are similar enough to raise
the equilibrium price. This formalizes the notion of joint dominance. Second,
when reading the newspapers on mergers, the situation seems more subtle than
the Williamson framework allows. For instance, there are cases where some
…rms oppose a proposed merger, while other (non-merging) …rms favour it. In
the Williamson framework, if a merger (due to e¢ciency gains) reduces one
…rm’s pro…ts, it reduces the pro…ts of all other (non-merging) …rms. As an
illustration of this issue, consider the Schneider/Legrand merger as described in
The Economist (2001). Siemens, one of the rivals of the merging …rms, argued
that the European Commission should oppose the merger because it would lead




8 solves the equation (1¡t)t =
pm(1¡pm)
2 . That is, …rms are
indi¤erent between limit pricing at t or sharing the market equally at the monopoly price.
26to higher (!) prices.11 The following merger example features each of these
e¤ects: joint dominance, higher equilibrium price, a …rm that gains and a …rm
that loses due to the merger.
Example Consider an industry with demand of the form X (p) = 4 ¡ p
and four …rms with constant marginal cost levels of c0 = 0;c1 = c2 = c3 = 0:3.
Then the subgame perfect equilibrium price equals p = 0:3. Now suppose …rms 1
and 2 merge so that they can improve their e¢ciency through some complemen-
tarities. If they merge, their marginal cost level becomes 0, c1&2 = 0. I assume
that the merged entity 1&2 keeps the two separate outlets it had before.12 One
can readily verify that after the merger the equilibrium price equals the monopoly
price for …rms with marginal cost levels equal to 0: pm = 2. Hence the merger
leads to joint dominance: the equilibrium price rises due to the merger (although
the merger leads to a big e¢ciency gain). Next, notice that …rm 0’s pro…ts are
reduced due to the merger. Indeed …rm 0 will oppose the merger on the ground
that it raises the equilibrium price! Finally, note that …rm 3’s pro…ts are raised
due to the merger. Before the merger, …rm 3 could not produce while it produces
a strictly positive output level after the merger.
As the example illustrates, the theory of price competition introduced in
this paper gives a richer framework to analyze merger issues that cannot be
addressed in, say, a Cournot model.
11One explanation for this is that Siemens opposed the merger because it expected a price
reduction (say, because of e¢ciency gains for the merged …rms). However, arguing to the
European Commision that a merger should be opposed because it reduces prices does not
seem to be convincing. So to convince the Commission, Siemens claimed it expected a price
increase. The example I give, using the subgame perfect equilibrium of the pricing game, does
not rely on Siemens misrepresenting its views to mislead the Commission.
12An issue in modelling mergers when marginal costs are constant is the e¤ect of the merger
on the market share of the merged …rm (see, for instance, Salant et al. (1983), Perry and
Porter (1985), McAfee et al. (1992)). In the example here, the question is whether a merged
…rm with n¡1 active opponents, has a market share of 1
n or 2
n+1? For my purposes, however,
this is not an issue as the merger is pro…table under either assumption.
275 Discussion and extensions
This section discusses the following …ve topics: entry deterence, asymmetric
information, rationing rules, sales at (non)equilibrium prices and tacit collusion.
Entry deterence An issue in entry deterence is that the incumbent …rm
wants to convince entrants that competition will be …erce after they enter. In
terms of table 1 in section 3.1, the incumbent …rm would like entrants (that
are equally or less e¢cient than the incumbent) to think that the industry is
characterized by Bertrand competition. But how can the incumbent convince
the entrant that it should have Bertrand conjectures?13 The theory proposed
here answers this question. If the incumbent is far more e¢cient than the
entrant then it will indeed be optimal (and hence the threat credible) to price
very aggressively to keep the entrant out of the market. If, on the other hand,
the entrant has an e¢ciency level similar to the incumbent, it will be optimal
to accomodate the entrant and hence threats to limit price are not credible. If
the entrant does not know the cost level of the incumbent, the incumbent may
want to signal that it is very e¢cient. In this case, there is an element added
to the analysis of entry deterence under asymmetric information as in Milgrom
and Roberts (1982). Now there are two reasons why the incumbent wants to
convince the entrant that its marginal costs are low. First, to signal that it will
be a tough opponent (for given aggressiveness of interaction) as in Milgrom and
Roberts. Second, to signal that competition will indeed be …erce after entry,
because the cost gap between the incumbent and entrant is big.
Asymmetric information In the analysis above it is assumed that …rms
marginal cost levels are common knowledge. What will change if …rm’s cost
levels are private information? The main change is to …rms’ bidding strategies.
13Although the Bertrand conjecture is always wrong in equilibrium, there is an additional
problem in the case of entry. If the entrant expects the incumbent to keep prices constant in
response to its own price changes (Bertrand conjecture) it does not expect the incumbent to
keep its price constant in response to its entry decision. The latter conjecture would, in fact,
make entry very attractive. In a sense this is counterintuitive: the entrant understands that
the incumbent changes its price in response to the entrant’s entry decision but still believes
that the incumbent does not change its price in response to price decisions by the entrant.
28Now …rms will reduce prices step by step to see which of its opponents will leave
the market after a certain price reduction. So in contrast to theorem 3 …rm i
will not bid p¤
i in the …rst round. To see this consider the following duopoly
with demand of the form X (p) = 4 ¡ p and where …rm 0 has marginal costs
equal to 0, c0 = 0. Firm 0 does not know the costs of its opponent, …rm 1. Firm
0 has the following information on 1’s marginal cost level
c1 =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 with probability y
1 with probability 1
4
1:5 with probability 3
4 ¡ y
with y 2 [0; 3
4]. To determine …rm 0’s biddingstrategy, I usebackward induction.
First, note that reducing the price to 0 can never be optimal for …rm 0, hence
the choice is between a price equal to 1, 1:5 or the monopoly price 2. Given that
…rm 0 ends up at a price equal to 1:5 and its opponent has not left the pricing
game, should it reduce the price to 1? If it does so, then with (conditional)
probability 1
4y+1 …rm 1 leaves the game and with probability
4y
4y+1 …rm 1 stays
in the game. Hence the expected pay o¤ of such a price reduction from p = 1:5











On the other hand, keeping the price at p = 1:5 with the opponent active yields
a pay o¤ equal to 17
8. Hence for all y < 3
4 it is optimal to reduce the price from
p = 1:5 to p = 1 if …rm 1 has not left the pricing game at a price p = 1:5. If
…rm 1 does leave at a price equal to p = 1:5, it is clearly optimal for …rm 0 to
stay put.
Knowing this, under which conditions is it optimal for …rm 0 to reduce the
price from p = 2 to p = 1:5? Expected pay o¤ from reducing the price from 2






















Staying put at a price equal to 2 yields a pay o¤ equal to 2. Hence, if y >
25
36 it
is not optimal to undercut the monopoly price for …rm 0 while for y <
25
36 it is
optimal for …rm 0 to reduce the price to p = 1:5.
In other words, the more likely it is that …rm 1 is very e¢cient (i.e. y is high)
the higher the equilibrium price. If it is unlikely that …rm 1 is very e¢cient (i.e.
29y close to 0) the equilibrium price is lower. This is line with the results found
above under symmetric information. The additional result is that for y < 25
36,
…rm 0 …rst bids p = 1:5. If …rm 1 stays in the market, …rm 0 bids p = 1 in the
next round. So unlike the result in theorem 3, the equilibrium is not necessarily
reached immediately after the …rst round but the price develops over time.
Rationing rules Above I have assumed that when n sellers are willing
to sell at the lowest price, each seller serves 1
n th of the market. Although this
assumption is reasonable in an I.O. context and more or less standard, one can
ask whether the results derived above critically depend on this assumption.
So if there are n …rms willing to sell at the lowest price, one can de…ne a
more general rationing rule as follows. Firm i gets a market share ¯ i where the
¯ i’s satisfy
¯ i ¸ 0 for all i 2 f0;1;:::;n ¡ 1g (3)
n¡1 X
i=0
¯ i = 1
For instance, Cournot competition in a homogenous good market where …rms
di¤er in e¢ciency yields an outcome where all …rms sell at the same price but
with di¤erent market shares. The question above can now be phrased as follows:
Can we have an equilibrium with p > c1 for all rationing rules satisfying (3)?
Clearly, the answer is ”no”. Consider the following two extreme cases (i) ¯0 = 0
and (ii) ¯0 = 1. In the …rst case, the most e¢cient …rm will never want to share
the market with another …rm and the subgame perfect equilibrium price equals
the Bertrand price (p = c1). The second case is more interesting. Here the
other …rms will never want to share the market. There is always a …rm i ¸ 1
that undercuts any price p > c1. In other words, although it seems advantegous
for …rm 0 to have a lot of market power ex post, ex ante …rm 0 would like to
commit to a lower market share. In particular, if …rm 0’s pro…t maximizing
price in lemma 2 satis…es p¤
0 = ci > c1 then …rm i is better o¤ with a rationing
rule ¯j = 1
i for all j 2 f0;1;:::;i ¡ 1g than with ¯0 = 1.
Although there are rationing rules that destroy any subgame perfect equi-
librium price above the Bertrand price, I now show that the results above do
not depend on the equal sharing rationing rule. In particular, I show that for
30every subgame equilbrium with equal market shares where the price is above
the Bertrand price, there exists a subgame equilibrium where …rms have di¤er-
ent market shares at the same market price. Second, I derive conditions on the
rationing rule (3) such that the price leadership lemma continues to hold.
I focus in the remainder on rationing rules which imply higher market shares
for more e¢cient …rms, that is
¯0 ¸ ¯ 1 ¸ ::: ¸ ¯n
which seems a reasonable assumption. The following result formalizes the idea
that the results derived in this paper do not hinge on the equal sharing assump-
tion.
Lemma 15 Assume that cj > cj¡1 for all j ¸ 1.14 If it is the case that
X (ci)
i
(ci ¡ c0) >
X (ck)
k
(ck ¡ c0) for all k 6= i
then there exist functions ¯j (n) satisfying
¯0 (n) > ¯1 (n) > ::: > ¯n¡1 (n) > 0 (4)
¯j (n) = 0 for all j ¸ n
n¡1 X
j=0
¯j (n) = 1
such that p = ci is the equilibrium price under this rationing rule.
Note that a rationing rule ¯j (n) has two arguments: the position of the
…rm (j) and the number of …rms in the market (n). The idea of the proof is to
construct rationing rules ¯j (n) close enough to the equal sharing rule that all
inequalities continue to hold for the equilibrium p = ci. Since the equilibrium
is de…ned with strict inequalities, this is always possible.
Finally, the next result derives su¢cient conditions on ¯ j (n) for the price
leadership lemma to hold.
Lemma 16 The price leadership lemma 2 continues to hold with a general ra-








14This assumption on costlevels is mainly made for notational convenience as presumably
one would like ci = cj (i 6= j) to imply ¯i = ¯j.
31for all n0 > n > i > j.
The assumptions on the rationing rule are that more e¢cient …rms have a
larger market share, that market shares are smaller if there are more …rms in the
market and equation (5) implies that as competition intensi…es through falling
prices the market share of …rm j rises compared to a less e¢cient …rm i. For
every rationing rule this assumption holds for the marginal …rm (n0 ¡ 1 in the
lemma), equation (5) extends this assumption to all …rms in the market. The
intuition is that as the market becomes more competitive (and the price falls)
…rm j gains market share at the expense of less e¢cient rivals. Therefore, the
…rm that stands to gain the most from a price reduction is …rm 0 and the price
leadership lemma continues to hold.
Sales at (non)equilibrium prices An important assumption in the model
above is that no sales are made before the pricing stage has come to an end and
the equilibrium price is reached. This implies that …rms can initially charge
high prices without the risk of loosing sales or customers if they are undercut
by opponents. Firms simply follow the lowest price and continue in the next
round (or leave) without loss of pro…ts. This is di¤erent in the duopoly model
of Maskin and Tirole (1988) where …rms choose prices in alternating periods.
Choosing a high price today may be costly in the next period if your opponent
undercuts the price and increases his market share at your expense.
The question addressed in this extension is: does the possibility of loosing
sales when a …rm bids high prices in early rounds of the pricing stage destroy the
subgame perfect equilibrium with prices above the Bertrand equilibrium price?
Before formalizing this question in the current framework, note that Maskin and
Tirole (1988) also …nd equilibria with prices above the Bertrand price. In other
words, in their fully dynamic model there are equilibria with a ‡avour similar
to the subgame perfect equilibrium above.
I extend the pricing stage described in section 2 as follows. In each round the
remaining bidders bid prices, as above. After these bids have been made, there
is a probability q that the pricing game ends immediately. That is, before other
…rms can indicate whether they want to follow the lowest price bid. In other
words, demand is served before the other …rms can react to the lowest price.
32The …rms that actually bid the lowest price in this round serve demand at that
price sharing the market equally. With a probability 1¡q the round continues as
above. That is, …rms can indicate whether they are willing to charge the lowest
price or leave the pricing game. The pricing stage then goes into the next round
where the …rms can underbid the current lowest price etc. In a given round, the
pricing game can thus end exogenously with probability q or endogenously (as
above) when no …rm undercuts the current lowest price. The di¤erence with
the analysis above is that it becomes more pro…table to undercut the current
lowest price. If you are the only …rm to undercut then with probability q you
gain the whole market and the game ends.
Note that with q = 1 the game is the Bertrand pricing game and the unique








(cj ¡ c0) ¸
X (ck)
k
(ck ¡ c0) for each k 6= j
¾
Another way to view the model here is that there is only one customer with a
demand function X (p). This customer arrives at the shops with a probability
q and then chooses the shop that at that moment charges the lowest price. In
this sense, q can also be viewed as the speed with which …rms can react to
price changes by opponents. Low values of q imply that …rms can react quickly
(relative to consumers). I come back to this below.
To analyze this game I need an additional (technical) assumption. To ensure
that optimal reactions exist (in particular, to make sure that slightly undercut-
ting your opponent is well de…ned) assume that price bids are integers, p 2 @.
To avoid rounding issues, I also assume that marginal cost levels are integers,
ci 2 @ for all i = 0;1;2;:::.15
The following result shows that the equilibrium analyzed above is not a knife
edge phenomenon which only occurs for q = 0.
15Note that the assumption that ci 2 @ rules out the argument above that having
two cost levels cj and cj0 (with cj 6= cj0) such that
X(cj)














k (ck ¡c0)for each k 6= j
¾
can have more than one element.
33Lemma 17 There exists ¹ q > 0 such that for all q 2 [0; ¹ qi it is the case that





(cj ¡ c0) ¸
X (ck)
k
(ck ¡ c0)for each k 6= j
¾
is an equilibrium price of the game described above.
This shows that the subgame perfect equilibrium analyzed in this paper
is robust to the introduction of a probability q > 0 that there are sales at
nonequilibrium prices, in the sense that the pricing game in section 2 has not
come to an end yet. If q is small enough, this incentive to undercut does not
destroy the subgame perfect equilibrium. If q is big (e.g. q = 1) the incentive
to undercut is too big for any price p > c1 to survive as an equilibrium.
If there are two prices (or more) cj and cj0 (with cj > cj0) that lead to
the same maximal pro…ts for the price leader, then the equilibrium price is
the lowest of these prices. Indeed, at p = cj, …rm 0 can undercut (e.g. to
cj0) thereby gaining the whole market with probability q and losing no pro…ts
with probability 1 ¡ q. Hence the higher prices (like cj) do not survive the
introduction of the probability q.
The reader may wonder why the extension of sales at nonequilibrium prices
is not done within the Maskin and Tirole (1988) framework (henceforth MT).
There are two reasons for this. First, MT analyze the case of a symmetric
duopoly and it is not clear whether meaningful analytical results can be derived
with three or more …rms that di¤er in e¢ciency. Second, and more important,
there is a conceptual di¢culty when extending MT to more than two …rms. In
MT …rms change prices in an alternating way (…rm 1 changing its price in even
periods, …rm 2 in odd periods). This makes sense with two …rms, because the
main reason why a …rm may want to update its price is that the other …rm
made a price change. However, when there are …ve …rms it is not convincing to
argue that each …rm can only adjust its price once every …ve periods. If one of
the …ve …rms undercuts the others in a certain period, it is reasonable to expect
that more than one …rm will want to react by adjusting its price. But if one
allows more than one …rm to adjust its price in a period, the unique equilibrium
is the Bertrand outcome.
My model avoids this problem by introducing the idea that undercutting
your opponents does not necessarily give you the whole market because no
34customer may arrive before your opponents react. If q is low, it is likely that
your opponents can react to your price cut before customers arrive and hence
undercutting is not pro…table.
Tacit collusion The result found above that the equilibrium price tends
to be higher the more symmetric …rms are, has a collusive ‡avour. Although I
have stressed that this result is not due to (explicit) collusion (because …rms act
independently), there is a link here with the literature on implicit collusion using
supergames (see, for instance, Green and Porter (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986) and Abreu (1986)). This literature derives conditions under which …rms
can coordinate on a collusive outcome due to the (in…nite) repetition of the
stage game.
The main di¤erences between this supergame approach and the one proposed
in this paper are the following. First, a disadvantage of the supergame approach
is that there is a multiplicity of equilibria, while the game proposed above yields
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Second, the supergame approach predicts
that collusion is harder to sustain if there are more …rms. In the game above
it is not so much the number of …rms that may hinder a collusive outcome as
the di¤erences between …rms. Third, the game described above is essentially
a one-shot game (although the pricing stage has a number of rounds). This
contrasts sharply with the supergame approach where repetition of the game is
important.
Another aspect that is stressed in the literature on collusion is how quickly
…rms can react to changing strategies by opponents (that is, how quickly do
they learn that an opponent deviates and how fast can they react to that in-
formation). The faster they can react to deviating behavior, the more collusive
outcome they can sustain. This suggests an alternative intuition for the obser-
vation that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is less competitive than
the Bertrand outcome. In the standard Bertrand game, …rms have no infor-
mation about other …rms’ prices and they cannot react at all if an opponent
charges a di¤erent price from what they expected. This is an extreme form of
price commitment. The pricing game in this paper makes the opposite extreme
assumption: …rms can react immediately to price changes by opponents. More
35precisely, …rms can react to such price changes before consumers do. In reality,
this is usually a matter of degree. In some industries it is the case that choosing
a price which turns out to be too high is very costly. The price is published
in a catalogue, cannot be easily changed and a lot of sales are lost before the
price is adjusted (i.e. q is high in the extension of the model in lemma 17).
In other industries, it is straightforward for …rms to get information on other
…rms’ prices and they can lower their price in reaction to a price cut before
losing much sales (i.e. q is low in lemma 17).
As an illustration of this, Bailey (1998) …nds that prices for books, CDs
and software are higher on the internet than for traditional retailers. The point
is that for traditional retailers it is harder to …gure out out what prices other
retailers are charging and it is more costly to reprice the books in store. For
an internet …rm, in contrast, it is easy and cheap to check opponents’ prices
(one mouseclick) and prices can be changed very quickly and cheaply (another
mouseclick) in response. Hence the theory of this paper would indeed predict
that prices are higher for internet …rms as the pricing game above (with its
subgame perfect equilibrium) is a more reasonable description of their situation
than the standard Bertrand pricing game. And this is true to a lesser extent
for the traditional retail stores.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a simple and intuitive pricing game formalizing the idea of
…rms undercutting each other to gain market share. Although the Bertrand out-
come is a Nash equilibrium in this game, it is not necessarily subgame perfect.
The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome formalizes the quote from Cham-
berlin at the beginning of the paper. The outcome is determined by the cost
distribution in the industry. If …rms are fairly symmetric, there is a balance
of power and therefore it is very costly for …rms to price aggressively. Conse-
quently, …rms behave nicely toward each other and the outcome is a high price.
If, on the other hand, one …rm (or a group of …rms) is far more e¢cient than
its opponents, there is no balance of power and it pays to be aggressive to price
the other …rms out of the market. Consequently, the equilibrium price is low.
36Because of this property, it is easy to see why entry or e¢ciency gains by
existing …rms can raise the equilibrium price: cost gaps are reduced and bal-
ance of power is established. With this theory it is straightforward to formalize
a number of issues in competition policy that are harder to capture with tra-
ditional industrial organization models, like Cournot or Bertrand competition.
Examples here are joint dominance, e¢ciency o¤ence and the idea that the
single European market may raise prices instead of reducing them.
I have argued that the subgame perfect equilibrium is most convincing as
a predictor of market outcomes in markets where …rms can react quickly to
price reductions by opponents. In markets where …rms can react to new price
information only with a considerable time lag, the Bertrand equilibrium seems
a more convincing prediction of the market outcome than the subgame perfect
equilirbium.
Although the theory is formulated here in an I.O. and auction context, the
underlying mechanism of balance of power is more widely applicable. In all
situations where aggressive play is not immediatele rewarded and hence leaves
time for opponents to react before pay o¤s are realized, it is not obvious that
more players or better players leads to a more aggressive outcome. Coming back
to the cold war example in the introduction, it is indeed the case that before
a superpower can reap the bene…ts of starting a nuclear war its opponent can
react.
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7 Appendix: proof of results
This appendix contains the proofs of the results in the main text.
Proof of lemma 1
It is routine to verify that the following strategy pro…les form a Nash equi-
librium and that they yield the Bertrand outcome. Any player i with cost level
ci > c0 stays in the pricing game at any price p strictly above ci and leaves the
pricing game if p · ci. Further, such a player i undercuts any price p strictly
above ci to (say)
p+ci
2 . Any player j with cj = c0 stays in the pricing game at
any price p ¸ cj and leaves the pricing game at p < cj. Further, such a player
j bids the price p = c1. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 2
This is proved by contradiction. Suppose that there exists i > j (i.e. ci ¸ cj)
39such that p¤
i = ci0 < cj0 = p¤
j (i.e. i0 < j0).
0 >
X (ci0)
i0 (ci0 ¡ cj) ¡
X (cj0)


























i0 (ci0 ¡ ci) ¡
X (cj0)
j 0 (cj0 ¡ ci)
The …rst inequality follows from the fact that p¤
j = cj0. The second inequality





j0 > 0. It follows that
X (cj0)
j0 (cj0 ¡ ci) >
X (ci0)
i0 (ci0 ¡ ci)
contradicting the initial assumption that p¤
i = ci0 < cj0. Q.E.D.
Proof of theorem 3
First, note that every subgame perfect equilibrium implies that each player
i leaves the pricing game when the price falls below his marginal cost level ci
and stays in the pricing game when the price is above ci. Any threat or promise
to do otherwise is not credible (i.e. is a dominated strategy). To make sure
equilibria are well de…ned, assume that a player i with ci > c0 does not produce
when p = ci while a player i with ci = c0 does produce when p = ci.
Second, note that the assumption that (p¡ c0) X (p) > (p0 ¡ c0) X (p0) for
all prices p;p0 satisfying p0 < p < pm implies that for each i it is the case that
(p ¡ ci) X (p) > (p
0 ¡ ci)X (p
0)
for all prices p;p0 satisfying p0 < p < pm. Suppose not, i.e. suppose that for
some player i it is the case that
(p ¡ ci) X (p) < (p
0 ¡ ci)X (p
0)
for some pair of prices p;p0 with p0 < p. This implies
(p¡ c0) X (p) + (c0 ¡ ci) X (p) < (p0 ¡ c0) X (p0) + (c0 ¡ ci) X (p0)
or equivalently
(p ¡ c0)X (p) ¡ (p0 ¡ c0) X (p0) < (ci ¡ c0)[X (p) ¡ X (p0)] · 0
40where the last inequality on the right follows from the observations that ci ¸ c0
and X (p) < X (p0). However, this contradicts the starting assumption that
(p¡ c0) X (p) > (p0 ¡ c0)X (p0). Hence, this proves (by contradiction) that for
each i it is the case that
(p ¡ ci) X (p) > (p0 ¡ ci)X (p0)
for all prices p;p0 satisfying p0 < p < pm. Hence choosing a price p 2 hcj;cj+1i
for some j ¸ 0 cannot be optimal for any player i . Pro…ts for i are always
higher by choosing p = cj+1 since this higher price raises (p¡ ci)X (p) and the
market is shared with the same j players as with a price p 2 hcj;cj+1i. Hence,
one only needs to consider prices p = cj (j = 1;2;:::;N).
Now turn to the claim that the (generically) unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium price equals p¤
0. Given the dominant exit strategy of players, it is optimal
for player 0 to undercut any price p > p¤
0. This follows directly from the de…n-
ition of p¤
0. Hence any subgame perfect equilibrium price satis…es p · p¤
0. So I
need to prove that a price p < p¤
0 cannot be subgame perfect.
Consider a subgame (round) s where the current price satis…es ps ¸ p¤
0:
Given the speci…ed exit strategy, is it in any player’s interest to bid ps+1 < p¤
0?
By de…nition of p¤
0 it is not in player 0’s interest to bid strictly below p¤
0. Further,
the following inequalities imply that if …rm 0’s pro…ts are higher at a price p














































where n (p) denotes the number of active …rms at price p. The inequality labelled




n(p) (at a lower price there is
more demand X and less …rms n that are active in the market). So given that
player 0 prefers p¤
0 above any price strictly below p¤
0, it is the case that no other
player has an incentive to bid a price strictly below p¤
0. Thus the (generically)
unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is p = p¤
0 and all …rms with ci < p¤
0
41are active. Q.E.D.
Proof of corollary 4
Since
X(cj+1)
j+1 (cj+1 ¡ c0) > 0, equation (1) implies that p = c0 cannot be a
subgame perfect equilibrium price. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 5
If ce > p and assume that p = ci for some i before entry, that is
X (ci)
i




for all j 6= i. Then for any ck < ce this inequality implies that ci is also optimal
after entry. For any ck > ce the inequality above implies
X (ci)
i
(ci ¡ c0) >
X (ck)
k




and hence ci yields higher pro…ts to …rm 0 then ck > ce. Finally, a price p = ce
was feasible before entry as well but then dominated by p = ci.
Any cost reduction from cj > p to c0
j 2 hp;cji will not change the subgame
perfect equilibrium price because any price p0 …rm 0 might switch to was avail-
able before the cost reduction as well but then it was dominated by p. Moreover,
any p0 > c0
j is weakly less pro…table after the cost reduction because the market
has to be shared with an additional …rm. Q.E.D.
Proof lemma 6
E¤ect on …rm 0’s pro…ts follows from a revealed preference argument. Any
price …rm 0 chooses after entry (or cost reduction by opponent), it could have
chosen before but it did not. Moreover, any p is weakly less pro…table after
entry (or cost reduction) than before.
Lemma 10 (proposition 13) derives conditions under which entry (cost re-
duction) leads to a higher price. Clearly any …rm with a marginal cost level
strictly between the equilibrium prices before and after entry (cost reduction)









for all l 2 fk;k + 1;:::;i ¡ 1g it follows that
X (ci)
i + 1




42for all l 2 fk;k + 1;:::;i ¡ 1g, as the following argument shows. Suppose this is
not the case, that is suppose that
X (ci)
i + 1




for some l 2 fk;k + 1;:::;i ¡ 1g. This can be rewritten as
X (ci)
i
(ci ¡ c0) ¡
X (cl)
l
(cl ¡ c0) ·
X (cl)(cl ¡ c0) ¡ X (ci) (ci ¡ c0)
il
The right hand side of this inequality is strictly negative by the assumption that
X (p)(p ¡ c0) is increasing in p < pm and cl < ci. Hence it follows that
X (ci)
i




which contradicts that p = ci is the equilibrium price before entry. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 9
(i) This is proved by contradiction. Suppose the price rises to ck > ci. Then
it must be the case that
X (ck)
k ¡ 1




This can be rewritten as









The left hand side of this inequality is strictly negative by the assumption that
X (p)(p ¡ c0) is increasing in p < pm and ck > ci. This contradicts that p = ci
is the equilibrium price before …rm l decides not to enter the pricing game.
(ii) Because a …rm with cl > ci decides not to enter the pricing game, the
optimality of p = ci implies that also after …rm l has left, it is the case that
X (ci)
i




for each j < i. Hence the subgame perfect equilibrium price cannot fall. The
price may rise because there can be a …rm k > l such that
X (ck)
k ¡ 1





Proof of lemma 10
43Equation (2) gives necessary and su¢cient conditions for p = ck to be the
subgame perfect equilibrium price after entry. To see this, note that for …rms j
with cj ¸ cl pricing at p = cj implies that there are j + 1 …rms in the market.
For prices cj · cl¡1 there are j …rms in the market (as before entry). Pricing at
p = ce implies that there willbe l …rms in the market (namely …rms 0;1;:::;l¡1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 11
To simplify notation, choose c0 = 0. Monopoly price pm is de…ned as pm =







I construct the industry cost distribution in such a way that in the initial equi-
librium (before entry) p = cn and hence we have n active …rms in the industry.
After entry, the price rises to p0 = cn+1 > cn. In order to get this price rise,











Because of equation (6) and the assumption that
d[pX (p)]
dp > 0 for all p < pm,
such a value of cn+1 can be found, as shown in …gure 2. Next, assign …rms







This makes sure that before entry the equilibrium price equals p = cn. Finally,
assign entering …rm e cost level ce = c0 = 0. Then entry by …rm e causes
the equilibrium price to rise from p = cn to p = cn+1, as can be seen as





n+2 implies that the priceleaders prefer p0 =














-Figure 2 around here-
44Proof of Lemma 12
(i) By continuity of the expression X (p) (p ¡ c0), it follows from
X (ci)
i




for each j 6= i that
X (ci ¡ ")
i




for " small enough.
(ii) Let j denote smallest value such that cj¡1 < ce · cj. Then the number














(cj ¡ c0) >
X (ck)
k
(ck ¡ c0) for each k 6= i;j
imply that p = cj is preferred above any price ck with k 6= i;j. Can a price
equal to c0
i yield higher pro…ts to …rm 0 than p = cj? The inequality above
together with the observation that
X (cg)
g






i ¡ c0) for c
0










and thus p = cj gives a higher pro…t to the price leader than p = c0
i. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 14
(i) By continuity of the expression X (p) (p ¡ c0), it follows from
X (ci)
i




for each j 6= i that
X (ci ¡ ")
i




45for " small enough.
(ii) Assume that before the cost reduction p = ci, that is
X (ci)
i






































for all j > i. Hence the equilibrium price does not rise. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 15













if j · n ¡ 1
0 if j ¸ n
satis…es ¯
"




j (n) = 1 and does not
violate the equilibrium inequalities at p = ci. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 16
This is proved by contradiction following the notation and the argument in
the proof of lemma 2. Suppose that there exists i > j (i.e. ci ¸ cj) such that
p¤
i = ci0 < cj0 = p¤
j (i.e. i0 < j 0).
0 > ¯j (i
0) X (ci0)(ci0 ¡ cj) ¡ ¯ j (j
0) X (cj0) (cj0 ¡ cj)
= ¯j (i
0) X (ci0)ci0 ¡ ¯ j (j
0)X (cj0) cj0 ¡ cj
¡
¯ j (i




¸ ¯ j (i
0)X (ci0) ci0 ¡ ¯j (j
0)X (cj0)cj0 ¡ ci
¡
¯j (i





X (ci0)(ci0 ¡ ci) ¡
¯j (j0)
¯j (i0)





X (ci0)(ci0 ¡ ci) ¡
¯i(j0)
¯ i(i0)
X (cj0)(cj0 ¡ ci)
¸
The …rst inequality follows from the fact that p¤
j = cj0. The second inequality
(labelled (¤)) follows from the observations that ci ¸ cj and that ci0 < cj0
implies that ¯j (i0) X (ci0) ¡ ¯j (j 0) X (cj0) > 0. The third inequality (labelled
(¤¤)) follows from equation (5). It follows that
¯i (j0)X (cj0)(cj0 ¡ ci) > ¯ i(i0)X (ci0) (ci0 ¡ ci)
46contradicting the initial assumption that p¤
i = ci0 < cj0. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 17
To prove this result, I use the one stage deviation principle (see, for instance,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). Note that the assumption made in the text that
price bids are integers, p 2 @, implies that the pricing game becomes a …nite
horizon game because it can have at most ¹ p ¡ c1 rounds, where ¹ p denotes the
price at which the pricing game starts. This is due to the fact that either the
current lowest price is undercut by (at least) 1 or if no bidder undercuts the
current price the pricing stage ends.
In order to show that the price ~ p de…ned as





(cj ¡ c0) ¸
X (ck)
k
(ck ¡ c0) for each k 6= j
¾
is an equilibrium price of the game with q close enough to 0, I prove that no
…rm has an incentive to deviate from this equilibrium by undercutting this price
~ p.
For notational convenience, let n(p) denote the number of …rms with mar-
ginal costs strictly below p. Then the pay o¤ to …rm i (with ci < ~ p) if it does
not deviate from the equilibrium equals
X(~ p)
n(~ p) (~ p¡ ci). Now consider player i
deviating from the equilibrium by undercutting to a price p0
i < ~ p. Its expected
pay o¤ can then be determined as follows. First, there is a probability q that
the game ends and …rm i gets a pay o¤ equal to X (p0
i) (p0
i ¡ ci). Second, with
probability (1 ¡ q) a new subgame is entered where the current lowest price
equals p0














Clearly this pay o¤ is an upperbound on the pay o¤ that player i can expect in
this subgame as other players may have an incentive to undercut p00
i .

















A su¢cient condition for player i not to deviate from the equilibrium price ~ p
can now be written as
X (~ p)
n(~ p)













(~ p ¡ ci) ¡ ¢i
¸
47This condition is satis…ed if
q < ¹ qi








n(~ p) (~ p ¡ ci)
De…ne ¹ q as ¹ q ´ minf¹ q0; ¹ q1;:::g and the result follows.
If there are two (or more) values of j such that
X (cj)
j
(cj ¡ c0) =
X (cj0)
j0 (cj0 ¡ c0) ¸
X (ck)
k
(ck ¡ c0) for each k
for j > j0 (and thus cj > cj0), then …rm 0 will undercut a price equal to cj until




j (cj ¡ c0) ¸
X (ck)
k (ck ¡ c0)for each k 6= j
o




(cj ¡ c0) ¡
X (cj0)
j0 (cj0 ¡ c0) = 0
in this case and hence …rm 0 has nothing to lose by undercutting the price





Figure 1: Single European market: equilibrium price as a function of the tariff t
Figure 2: finding a value for cn+1 satisfying cn+1X(cn+1)/(n+1) < cnX(cn)/n and 
cn+1X(cn+1)/(n+2) > cnX(cn)/(n+1)
c
cX(c)/(n+1)
cX(c)/(n+2)
pm
cnX(cn)/n
cnX(cn)/(n+1)
cn cn+1